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JOINDER OF CRIMINAL CHARGES,
ELECTION, DUPLICITY
MAX D. MELVILLE
of the Denver Bar
This is one of a series of memoranda on criminal law and procedure pre-
pared under the direction of Bert M. Keating, District Attorney, Denver, Colo-
rado, for use by his staff and for distribution to other Colorado district attorneys.
This memorandum, which applies alike to indictments, informa-
tions and criminal complaints, discusses (1) joinder and mis-
joinder of charges, (2) election between counts and (3) dupli-
citous and nonduplicitous statements of more than one offense in
a single count. Counts are numbered as separate statements of
criminal charges in a single instrument. For example, Count 1 may
charge burglary, Count 2 larceny and Count 3 the receiving of
stolen personal property knowing it to be stolen.
Two or more criminal offenses may properly be charged in
one information if the joinder meets the tests hereafter discussed.
If joined, they must be stated in separate counts. '35 C. S. A., c.
48, §450.
A statute, '35 C. S. A., c. 48, §449, provides that, for example,
a charge of assault with intent to commit murder may be joined
with a charge of assault with a deadly weapon, instrument or
other thing with an intent to commit upon the person of another
a bodily injury [both of which crimes are defined in section 67
of chapter 48, '35 C. S. A.], provided those offenses arose from
the same transaction. And under either of those charged a de-
fendant may be found guilty of an assault without there being
any separate count charging that misdemeanor. The reason is
that an "assault" is an essential element in either offense and is
a lesser included offense, and the accused may be guilty of it even
though he did not have the specific intent to kill or do bodily
injury. See People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 126, 169 P. 152.
Assault and battery, however, is not an included offense in
assault to murder or assault to injure, and would have to be set
up in a separate count. Lane v. People, 102 Colo. 83, 77 P. 2d 121.
But it would be futile to make the charge since the penalty for it
and for simple assault are the same. '35 C. S. A., c. 48, §68, as
amended. Moreover, under the view expressed in the recent case
of Eckhardt v. People, 126, Colo .-......, 247 P. 2d 673, 677, a mis-
demeanor charge should not be joined with one for a felony,
which means that assault with intent to murder, a felony, should
not be joined with assault and battery, a misdemeanor.
A statute, '35 C. S. A., c. 48, §449, provides that charges of
(1) larceny, (2) embezzlement and (3) receiving stolen goods
may be joined. They must be stated in separate counts, '35 C. S. A.,
c. 48, §450, and, as will appear later, must arise from the same
DICTA
April, 1953
transaction or series of transactions. Ordinarily, there may be
a conviction on but one of the charges. Hill v. Best, 101 Colo. 243,
248, 248, 72 P. 2d 471; Sanders v. People, 109 Colo. 243, 244-245.
In other words, a person may not be convicted of both embezzle-
ment or larceny by bailee and larceny of the same property at
one time. Nor may he be convicted of any of those offenses and
also of criminally receiving the same property if it appears that
he personally stole or wrongfully converted to his own use, or
was personally present at such stealing or conversion. The excep-
tion to this rule would arise if he was an accessory before the
fact to the crime by counseling and advising it, '35 C. S. A., c. 48,
§13, and then knowingly received such property. In such case,
he probably could be convicted both as a principal in the theft or
conversion and as a receiver of the personal property. See Spinuzza
v. People, 99 Colo. 303, 306, 62 P. 2d 471.
Counts for burglary and larceny may be joined, Hill v. Best,
101 Colo. 243, 72 P. 2d 471, as may be counts for burglary and
for receiving stolen goods. Parker v. People, 13 Colo. 155, 160,
21 P. 1120. This decision discusses the notorious "Boss" Tweed
case, 60 N. Y. 559, which, the Colorado court said, "has called
for the severest criticism from our ablest criminal-law writers,
and is contrary to the weight of authority both in England and
in this country." There Tweed was charged in one indictment
with 220 law violations, charged in separate counts, and was con-
victed of 204. The court sentenced him separately on twelve con-
victions, the sentence on the first being for the maximum allow-
able. After he had served the first sentence, the New York Court
of Appeals freed him, holding that the sum of all of the punishments
could not exceed the maximum fixed for a single conviction. But
the court made the anomalous statement that had the 220 offenses
been charged in separate indictments, he could have been con-
victed on each and have been given the maximum sentence on each.
It is the practice when there has been a burglary coupled
with a larency, to charge in separate counts (1) burglary, (2)
larceny and (3) receiving stolen goods. While a person could
not be found guilty of all three of those crimes in a single trans-
action [unless he was both a receiver and an accessory before
the fact by counseling and advising], nonetheless he may be con-
victed of both the burglary and the larceny and receive separate
sentences to run one after the other. For example, if an accused
entered a home with intent to steal, he was guilty of burglary; and
if while so in the house he stole personal property, he committed
the crime of larceny. While there was but one transaction, yet
two separate crimes arose from it. Hill v. Best, 101 Colo. 243, 246,
74 P. 2d 471. Of course, if it was alleged in a single count that
defendant entered and stole, but one crime would be stated, Hill
v. Best, supra, which would be burglary. Collins v. People, 69 Colo.
343, 344, 193 P. 634.
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In all of these cases mentioned and to be mentioned, if several
persons participated in the offense, whether as principals or as
accessories before the fact, it is within the discretion of the dis-
trict attorney whether they shall be charged jointly in one in-
formation. Even when they are charged separately their cases
may be consolidated for trial if the judge thinks it advisable.
Quinn v. People, 32 Colo. 135, 75 P. 396. The same thing is true
where several informations are filed charging one or more per-
sons with offenses which lawfully may be joined in separate
counts. '35 C. S. A., c. 48, §450.
Section 450, chapter 48, '35 C. S. A. [the subdivisions of which
will be treated out of order for convenience and discussion] pro-
vides that where there are several charges against the same per-
son or persons for (1) one or more acts or transactions of the same
class of crimes or offenses which may be properly joined, or for
(2) the same act or transaction, or (3) two or more acts or trans-
actions connected together, such charges may be made in one
information, or if several informations have been filed they may
be consolidated for trial.
SAME CLASS OF CRIMES
Although the statute does not say so, it has been held that
the offenses, to be joinable, must either (1) arise from the same
transaction, or (2) be connected together. It is not enough that
the crimes are of the same class, or even the same crime in name.
Cummins v. People, 4 Colo. App. 71, 74, 34 P. 734; White v. Peo-
ple, 8 Colo. App. 289, 293, 45 P. 839.
For example, the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses
from A on one day cannot be joined with the crime of obtaining
money by false pretenses from B on another day, Cummins v.
People, 4 Colo. App. 71, 45 P. 734, or even on the same day if
the transactions are distinct. Hummel v. People, 98 Colo. 98, 52
P. 2d 669. It is only when the offenses arise from the same trans-
action, as where one robs two other persons at the same time,
that crimes, even of the same class, may be joined. See Wood v.
People, 60 Colo. 211, 212, 151 P. 941.
Again, for example, a number of larcenies from different
persons at different time cannot be joined, even though they were
committed on the same day. The reason is that the offenses arise
from different acts or transactions. Hummel v. People, 98 Colo. 98,
52 P. 2d 669.
The two examples above are where the offenses were against
different persons. But the principle applies equally where such
offenses are against the same person, if they did not arise from
the same transaction or are not connected together. Thus, where
there was an illegal joinder of offenses in an indictment which
charged defendant in Count 1 with the larceny of two head of
neat cattle from one Tolle on March 1, in Count 2 with larceny
of eight head of neat cattle from Tolle on May 20, and in Count 3
with larceny of eight head of neat cattle from Tolle on July 3,
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and where defendant was convicted on Counts 2 and 3, such con-
viction was reversed because of the misjoinder of those separate
transactions, although they were of the same class of crimes.
White v. People, 8 Colo. App. 289, 293, 45 P. 539.
SAME ACT OR TRANSACTION
Whenever separate crimes arise from the same act or trans-
action they always may be joined, provided they are of the same
class of crimes; for example, if both are felonies. Thus, in Eck-
hardt v. People, 126 Colo -...... ,247 P. 2d 673, 677, where a count for
voluntary manslaughter, a felony, was joined with one for assault
and battery, a misdemeanor, the supreme court expressed its dis-
approval, saying:
In the instant case, the two counts, of course relate
to the same transaction, but they do not relate to the
same class of crime. The fact that the court finally
charged on involuntary manslaughter, which is a misde-
meanor, does not alter or change the question presented
because the information as filed and as [it] remained
throughout the case, contained a first count of felony and
second count of misdemeanor. This does not present two
degrees of the same crime, but initiates a crime of a dif-
ferent class. So far as this state is concerned, this situ-
ation may require legislative correction. The practice of
joining a felony with a misdemeanor has, in some isolated
cases, undoubtedly followed, and technically speaking, we
cannot say that it is forbidden, or that such practice is
precluded by our present statute. However, when we con-
sider that under our statutes, in a case of homicide, as-
sault and battery is not one of the offenses as of an
inferior degree . . . we disapprove of the practice of
joinder as herein found.
As stated, separate crimes of the same class may be joined
if they arise from the same act or transaction; and this is true
whether the crimes be against the same person and different in
nature, or whether the same kind of crime be committed against
two or more persons.
Thus, as an example of the first situation, if in one transac-
tion A unlawfully enters B's home with intent to commit the
crime of larceny therein, and in fact does steal personalty in the
home, he is guilty of both burglary and larceny, and the charges
may be joined in the same information in two counts. Hill v. Best,
101 Colo. 243, 73 P. 2d 471.
And, as an example of the second situation, if A holds up B
and C at one time and place and robs each of personal property,
he is guilty of two separate robberies, which may be charged in
one information in separate counts, Wood v. People, 60 Colo. 211,
151 P. 941, and where a defendant is charged in separate informa-
tions with killing two persons at the same time and place, the in-
formations may be consolidated for trial. Harris v. People, 55 Colo.
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407, 135 P. 785. On the matter of different robberies stemming
from the same transaction, see In re Allison, 13 Colo. 525, 55 P. 820.
STATING TRANSACTION IN DIFFERENT WAYS
There are times when it is difficult to determine whether a
particular theft is larceny, larceny by bailee or embezzlement be-
cause of the problem of proving whether "possession" of the
property was obtained by defendant [1] wrongfully by trespass
or fraud [larceny], or [2] rightfully [larceny by bailee or em-
bezzlement], or, if rightfully, whether defendant's possession
came to him [a] under an express or implied contract of bailment
to deal with the property in a certain way [larceny by bailee-
Seebass v. People, 116 Colo. 555, 564, 182 P. 2d 901; Lewis v. Peo-
ple, 114 Colo. 411, 415, 166 P. 2d 150], or [b] by reason of his
office or employment [embezzlement-Sparr v. People, 122 Colo.
35, 38-39, 219 P. 2d 317]. Also, there is sometimes the possibility
that the evidence may show that defendant actually was not guilty
of the theft or the felonious conversion of the property, but re-
ceived it after the crime, knowing it to be stolen or feloniously
converted [receiving stolen goods].
In such situations it is permissible to charge the defendant
in separate counts in the same information with (1) larceny, (2)
larceny by bailee, (3) embezzlement and (4) receiving stolen
goods. '35 C. S. A., c. 48, §449; Smaldone v. People, 102 Colo. 500,
505, 81 P. 2d 384. Then if, as suggested above, there is a dispute
in the evidence as to the manner in which defendant came into
possession of the property, all of the counts are submitted to
the jury and they determine the disputed question, being in-
structed that they may find defendant guilty of but one offense.
Sanders v. People, 109 Colo. 243, 244-245, 125 P. 2d 154; Hill v.
Best, 101 Colo. 243, 248, 72 P. 2d 471, explaining Blackett v. Peo-
ple, 98 Colo. 7, 17, 52 P. 2d 389. The judge cannot compel the
prosecution to elect at the end of its case-in-chief upon which
of those charged offenses it will rely for conviction. If there is
insufficient evidence as to one or more of the counts, the judge
should direct a verdict of not guilty upon such count or counts;
but as long as the various charges relate to the same transaction
and a question of fact remains as to the offense which was com-
mitted, all counts must be submitted to the jury, and the prosecu-
tion cannot be compelled to elect. Kelly v. People, 17 Colo. 130,
133, 29 P. 805; Johnson v. People, 79 Colo. 439, 442, 246 P. 202;
Smaldone v. People, 102 Colo. 500, 505-506, 81 P. 2d 385. There
can, of course, be but one conviction arising from the theft or
receipt of the same money in the same transaction. Hill v. Best,
101 Colo. 243, 248-249, 72 P. 2d 471.
Whenever separate crimes of the same class arise from trans-
actions or acts that are "connected together," they may be joined
in separate counts in the same information. For example, where
a single statute made it a criminal offense (1) to manage or
assist in managing a house of prostitution or (2) to live on or be
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supported wholly or partially by the earnings of a prostitute, a
defendant was properly charged, in separate counts, with violating
both of those prohibitions of the statute. The court said:
The crimes charged are both for the violation of
the same section of the statute. They are for acts and
transactions of the same class of crimes and in this case,
as disclosed by the record, for acts and transactions con-
nected, done and performed at the same time and place;
the facts were intermingled; this brought them within
the provisions of this act. Trozzo v. People, 51 Colo. 323,
329, 117 P. 150. See also Harris v. People, 55 Colo. 407,
135 P. 785.
In Shaw v. People, 72 Colo. 142, 144, 209 P. 812, defendant
was charged in separate informations with (1) receiving stolen
goods and (2) with conspiring with John Doe to steal them. The
informations were consolidated for trial and defendant was con-
victed on both charges. The supreme court, in upholding the
conviction, said:
The consolidation was erroneous, it is said, because
the two offenses were not connected and did not grow
out of the same transaction and the proof of one would
have no tendency to prove the other. The prejudice al-
leged is that under this consolidation the jurors had their
attention directed to other similar offenses not otherwise
admissible. We think the position untenable. The trans-
actions were connected. Proof of one did tend to prove
the other. No prejudice resulted, because evidence of
other transactions to show scheme or intent would have
been admissible under either charge if tried separately.
In many of the cases thus far discussed, the charges
were made in separate indictments or informations and
were consolidated for trial, but they have been treated
as though they were made in separate counts in the same
information or indictment. The test of joinder is the
same in either case, since section 450, chapter 48, '35
C. S. A., says that joinable offenses may be joined in
one indictment in separate counts, and if two or more
indictments are found in such cases the court may order
them consolidated. Cummins v. People, 4 Colo. App. 71,
74, 34 P. 734.
Joinable crimes may be different offenses against differ-
ent persons, as long as they are connected together. For exam-
ple, A and B find C and Miss D sitting in an automobile. While
B intimidates C with a gun to prevent his interfering, A rapes
Miss D; and then B in turn rapes her while A holds the gun
on C. A, at gunpoint, forces C to remove his trousers and he
and B then drive away in C's car with the trousers. A and B
may be jointly charged in separate counts in the same informa-
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tion with (1) rape of Miss D and (2) robbery of 0. See State v.
Thompson, 139 Kan. 59, 29 P. 2d 1101, where it was said:
The reason for separate charges and separate trials
fails when the acts constituting the crimes are connected
together in a series in such a way that they amount to
one comprehensive transaction, and this is true whether
or not the offenses are of the same general nature. For
example, A breaks and enters a house in the night time
with intent to commit a crime, thus committing burglary.
He steals a $100 ring and other property, thus committing
grand larceny. He rapes the woman of the house, thus
committing rape. On being discovered by the man of the
house he kills him, thus committing murder. To conceal
his crime he maliciously sets fire to the home, thus com-
mitting arson. All of these acts form such a chain in
time, place and circumstances that they constitute one
combination event. The various crimes are separate, not
in relation to each other but only by definition in the
statutes, and there is no reason why they should not be
joined in separate counts in one information.
Granato v. People, 97 Colo. 303, 49 P. 2d 431, presents
an analogous situation where the court undoubtedly would have
permitted joinder of two charges against a defendant involving
the rape of two girls in immediately connected transactions. There,
A assisted B in removing one girl from an automobile so that
B could rape her (thus becoming an accessory before the fact,
and hence chargeable as a principal, in that crime) and then
raped another girl he had detained in the automobile.
Moreover, different crimes against the same person may be
joined in separate counts if they are connected together. Thus,
A may be charged in one count with the rape of Miss B and in
a second count with the crime of sodomy against her, if the two
transactions were connected. Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 530,
223 P. 41.
Frequently, so that some count will meet the evidence at the
trial, the district attorney will set up counts containing different
statements of the transaction. This is permissible. Bergdahl v.
People, 74 Colo. 528, 530, 223 P. 41. The question usually arising
is whether the counts relate to the same transaction. If the an-
swer does not appear on the face of the information, the district
attorney's statement to the court that but one transaction is in-
volved is sufficient, and the count may not require the district
attorney to elect before trial as to which count he will rely upon
for conviction. People v. Fitzgerald, 51 Colo. 175, 177, 117 P. 135.
This is because the counts in an information are presumed to
relate to the same transaction until the contrary appears. Short
v. People, 27 Colo. 175, 185, 60 P. 350. This rule applies to in-
formations consolidated for trial, even though each information
contains more than one count, since if the informations could
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properly be joined for trial, the charges in them could have been
stated in different counts in the same information. Bergdahl v.
People, 27 Colo. 302, 305, 61 P. 228.
Of course, if when the prosecution presents its evidence it
appears that in fact the counts do not relate to the same trans-
action, then, on motion of the defendant, the court will require
the prosecution to elect at that time the count upon which it will
rely for conviction.
WAIVER OF MISJOINDER
The fact of misjoinder of counts must be taken advantage of
by the defendant by motion at the earliest possible time or it is
completely waived. It cannot be raised later, even upon review
by the supreme court. If, for example, Count 1 charges A with
larceny from B on a named day, and Count 2 charges him with
larceny from B on another day, the fact of misjoinder is clear
on the face of the information, since the two offenses could not
possibly arise from the same transaction or connected transac-
tions. In such case the misjoinder issue must be raised before trial
or it is waived. Critchfield v. People, 91 Colo. 127, 131, 13 P. 2d 270.
And if the fact of misjoinder does not appear until the evi-
dence comes in at the trial-as where it then appears that the
counts do not, as the district attorney claimed, arise from the
same transaction-the defendant must move to require the prose-
cution to elect before the case goes to the jury, or the misjoinder
is waived. Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 223 P. 41; Warren v.
People, 121 Colo. 118, 122, 223 P. 2d 381.
There is no duty on the trial judge to compel, on his own
motion, an election. The defendant must make the motion, and
if he fails to do so a misjoinder of counts is waived for all pur-
poses. Quinn v. People, 32 Colo. 135, 138, 75 P. 396; Sarno v.
People, 74 Colo. 528, 530, 223 P. 41; Warren v. People, 121 Colo.
118, 121-122, 213 P. 2d 381. In Trask v. People, 35 Colo. 83, 88,
83 P. 1010, the supreme court overruled a contrary holding in
White v. People, 8 Colo. App. 289, 294, 300, 45 P. 539.
It has been stated, in Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 213, 215-216,
17 P. 637, that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court
whether the prosecution must elect the count, as between or among
a number of counts, upon which it will rely for conviction. This
is both true and untrue, depending upon the particular facts
involved.
It is true where, despite the statement of the prosecutor to
the contrary, the counts relate to different transactions. When
the evidence develops that fact, the court will grant defendant's
motion to require an election.
It is also true where, as in statutory rape cases, there have
been several instances of the offense by defendant against the
same female. The information will charge a single offense as
occurring on a named day, but that date actually is immaterial.
The prosecution is not bound by its date allegation, but may prove
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any day within the statute of limitations, Laycock v. People, 66
Colo. 441, 444, 182 P. 880, and may prove that the offense was
committed a number of times. Eventually, however, the prosecu-
tion, on defendant's motion, must elect as to the specific act upon
which it will rely. The discretion of the trial judge in such cases
is as to when the election is to be made-whether before taking
of evidence begins, during the progress of the trial, or at the close
of the prosecution's case in chief. In any event, it must be before
the defendant proceeds with his defense. Laycock v. People, 66
Colo. 441, 444-445, 182 P. 880; Schreiner v. People, 95 Colo. 392,
395, 36 P. 2d 764; Shier v. People, 116 Colo. 353, 356-357, 181 P.
2d 366. See Schuete v. People, 33 Colo. 325, 80 P. 890. Where
but one offense is charged, but under the allegation it is possible
to prove others, a motion to elect before the evidence is in show-
ing them is premature. Warford v. People, 43 Colo. 107, 109,
96 P. 556.
This rule as to election by the prosecution applies, however.
only when there are two or more transactions. While it was stated
in Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 213, 215-216, 17 P. 637, that, "A
motion to compel a prosecutor to elect upon which count in an
indictment he will proceed, when such indictment contains more
than one count, each charging a felony, is a matter addressed to
the discretion of the trial court," nonetheless, as was said in Kelly
v. People, 17 Colo. 130, 133-134, 29 P. 805, "The district attorney
was at liberty to proceed to trial upon both counts of the indict-
ment at the same time; and he could not properly be required to
elect upon which count he would rely so long as it appears from
the evidence that the two counts related to the same transaction.
In considering what was said in Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 215,
about compelling the prosecution to elect, the distinctions between
different counts and different transactions must be kept in mind."
Accordingly, the rule is that "where the counts are properly
joined the people are not obliged to elect". Smaldone v. People,
102 Colo. 500, 505-506, 81 P. 2d 385. In some of these cases of
joinder there could be but one conviction, and in others there
could be a conviction on each count; but in neither event is an
election required.
If, as an example of where but one conviction could be had,
one count charges larceny and the second charges larceny by
bailee, defendant could not be found guilty of committing both
crimes in unlawfully converting the same property in a single
transaction. If the evidence fails to support one of the charges.
the court may direct a verdict of acquittal on that count. But
if a question of fact exists as to whether possession was wrong-
fully obtained [larceny] or rightfully obtained [larceny by bailee],
the jury must decide the fact issue. Therefore, both counts must
be submitted, with instructions that they may find the defendant
guilty of one or the other of the offenses, as they determine from
the evidence, but not of both. See Hill v. Best, 101 Colo. 243, 248,
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72 P. 2d 471, explaining Backett v. People, 98 Colo. 7, 17, 52 P.
2d 389.
If, as an example of where there can be conviction on more
than one count, the first count charges that A unlawfully entered
the house of B with intent to commit larceny therein, and the
second count alleges that A committed larceny in B's house, and
the transaction is the same, B may be convicted of burglary on
the first charge and larceny on the second. Obviously, there, the
court could not compel an election, since while there was but one
transaction, two distinct offenses were committed during it. Hill
v. Best, 101 Colo. 243, 72 P. 2d 471.
DUPLICITY
Duplicity is the joinder of two or more criminal offenses
in a single statement. It may occur in a single-count information
or within one or more of several counts.
The offenses may be (1) such as could be joined in separate
counts because arising from the same transaction or from con-
nected transactions, or (2) such as may not be joined because
relating to distinct, unconnected transactions.
For example, if the single statement is that A, intending to
commit larceny, unlawfully entered B's house and did so steal
personal property therein, the count is duplicitous because it
co-mingles two crimes in one statement. If A moves to quash
the information because of the duplicity, the district attorney
may allege the burglary and the larceny in separate counts be-
cause they arose from the same transaction. Hill v. Best, 101 Colo.
243, 247-248, 72 P. 2d 471. [If, however, A goes to trial on the
single allegation, there can be but one conviction-and that is
for burglary, Collins v. People, 69 Colo. 343, 344, 193 P. 634-
and he has been in jeopardy on both crimes. Hill v. Best, 101 Colo.
243, 246, 72 P. 2d 471.]
On the other hand, if the single charge is that A burglarized
B's house on May 1, and that on June 1 he stole B's automobile,
the information or count is also duplicitous because it charges
two crimes in a single statement; but in this instance the crimes
could not be joined in separate counts in the same information,
since they involve independent, unconnected offenses.
If an information charges in a single count that A, as bailee
of B, feloniously converted to his own use the personal property
in the bailment, namely, (1) certain household furniture, (2)
certain clothing, (3) a certain diamond ring and (4) a certain
sum of money, all the property of B, it is not, ON ITS FACE,
duplicitous, since the presumption is that there was but one bail-
ment of all the property and but a single conversion. In such
case, if the evidence at the trial shows four separate bailments
by B to A for different purposes, and shows the conversions were
at different times, the information in fact was duplicitous. Advan-
tage of that error may be taken by a motion to quash made at
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the trial because then was the first time such fact appeared. Trask
v. People, 35 Colo. 83, 83 P. 1010.
On the other hand, if it appeared from the evidence that
while there were different bailmenrts they nevertheless were for
the same purpose-as, say, for safekeeping-and that all of the
property was converted at one time, there was no duplicity. This
is because the crime lay in the felonious conversion, and as there
was but one, the offense was single. Lewis v. People, 114 Colo 411,
419, 166 P. 2d 150.
Similarly, where a count alleges that at one time and place
defendant stole the personal property of a number of persons,
the count is not duplicitous inasmuch as there was but one theft
and but one crime. Sweek v. People, 85 Colo. 479, 483-485, 277
P. 1.
A count charging a conspiracy to commit a number of crimes
is not duplicitous, since the gist of the offense is the unlawful
agreement and combination. Hamilton v. People, 24 Colo. 301,
303, 51 P. 425.
It was held in McLean v. People, 66 Colo. 486, 493, 180 P. 876,
that:
If, as is common in legislation, a statute makes it
punishable to do a particular thing specified, "or" an-
other thing, "or" another, one commits the offense who
commits any one of the things, or any two or more, or
all of them. And the indictment may charge him with
any one, or with any larger number, at the election of
the pleader; employing, if the allegation is of more than
one, the conjunction "and" where "or" occurs in the
statute.
For example, the forgery statute, '35 C. S. A., c. 48, §130,
declares it a crime (1) to forge an instrument or (2) to pass a
forged instrument knowingly. The prosecutor [if he wishes but
one conviction and penalty, or if he is unsure what the evidence
will develop] may always allege in a single count that defendant
"forged and passed" the instrument. The count is not duplicitous
and there can be put one penalty. Again, the forgery statute
makes it an offense either to "falsely make" or to "alter" an in-
strument with intent to defraud. While "altering" refers to a
previously genuine instrument and the charge is repugnant to
that of "falsely making" the same instrument, both may be charged
conjunctively in a single count.
No matter in which way the act is violated, the crime commit-
ted is forgery. Consequently, there can be no prejudice resulting
to the defendant in reciting in the information several ways the
crime may be committed. If defendant violated the statute in
only one way, the fact that the other ways were alleged is mere
surplusage and not prejudicial to his rights in any manner. Wright
v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 310, 181 P. 2d 447.
Accordingly, so long as the count states the various violations
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of the statute in the conjunctive there is no duplicity. Another
illustration is found in Johnson v. People, 79 Colo. 439, 441, 246
P. 202, where it was said:
The information was in a single count. It charged
that defendant did "own, operate and have in his pos-
session a still used, designed and intended for the manu-
facture of intoxicating liquor." Defendant moved to re-
quire the people to elect, because "he does not know of
which of these offenses he is charged." He must have
known. He was told by the information that he was
charged with all three. The charges were based on a sin-
gle transaction and he was found guilty of possessing and
operating. Had he owned one still, possessed another and
operated another, or owned at one time, possessed at
another, and operated at another, he would have been
guilty of three separate offenses. If at a single time and
place he owned, possessed and operated, or possessed and
operated, or owned and possessed, he was guilty of but
one. A motion to elect is addressed to the sound discre-
tion of the trial court. Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 213,
215, 17 P. 637. Even where the charges are contained in
separate counts the motion will not be sustained if the
counts relate to the same transaction. Kelly v. People,
17 Colo. 130, 133, 29 P. 805. This motion was properly
overruled.
In People v. Fitzgerald, 51 Colo. 175, 176, 117 P. 135, it
was said:
The question for consideration is the ruling of the
trial court sustaining a motion to quash the information.
That pleading was drawn under, and based upon, Sec.
1685 Revised Statutes 1908, which, so far as pertinent
here, reads: "Any person who shall steal, take, em-
bezzle, carry or ride away any bicycle, or any person
who shall purchase or receive from any person, or con-
ceal or secrete, knowing the same to be stolen, taken,
embezzled, carried or ridden away, any bicycle, shall be
deemed guilty of larceny." The information, following
closely the language of the statute, in the charging part
states that "Simon Fitzgerald, . . . did feloniously
steal, take, embezzle, carry and ride away, and did felon-
iously then and there purchase and receive from some
person to the district attorney aforesaid unknown, and
did feloniously conceal and secrete the said bicycle, then
and there knowing the same to be stolen, taken, embez-
zled, carried and ridden away."
The motion to quash was based upon the proposition
that the information is "ambiguous, uncertain and du-
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plicitous" in that it fails to inform the defendant for
what particular crime he is being prosecuted and that
three distinct and inconsistent crimes against defendant
are charged in one and the same count of the informa-
tion. The court was clearly wrong in sustaining the mo-
tion to quash. The statute is in the disjunctive. The
stealing of a bicycle by a defendent, or the purchase or
receiving from any person, or the concealing or secreting
of a bicycle, knowing that the same has been stolen, all
are, and each is, under the statute deemed larceny. An
information conjunctively charging the same defendant
with doing all of these acts at the same time and as a
part of the same transaction is not duplicitous. Such is
the rule already established in this jurisdiction, and it
should have been heeded and applied by the district court
in this cause. We shall not repeat the argument to sup-
port it. We refer to, and again approve, McClure v.
People, 27 Colo. 358 [61 P. 12]. After reviewing and
discussing a number of cases bearing upon the point
now under consideration, this court, at page 367, thus
summarized its conclusion: "Where two or more acts,
stated in the statute disjunctively, either of which is an
offense by itself if done by different persons or at dif-
ferent times, when done by the same person and at the
same time and relate to the same transaction and are
followed by the same penalty, they may be united in one
count of an indictment or information, as constituting
but one offense. Though the fact does not appear upon
the face of the information, under the doctrine announced
in Short et al. v. People, 27 Colo. 175 [60 P. 350], the
mere statement of the district attorney that the differ-
ent acts relate to and constitute one and the same trans-
action is sufficient as against a motion to quash. This
information, in form, is like the one before the court in
McClure v. People, supra. Under the bicycle statute pre-
cisely the same penalty is imposed whether the defend-
ant stole the bicycle, or purchased it with the knowledge
that it had been stolen, or concealed or secreted it with
such knowledge. The ruling of the court is wrong. Trial
courts must be governed by the rule of pleading again
approved in this opinion. It follows that judgment on
motion to quash the information was wrong, and is there-
fore disapproved and reversed."
Other cases with the same ruling are Pettit v. People, 24 Colo.
517, 218, 52 P. 756; Rowe v. People, 26 Colo. 542, 544, 59 P. 57;
Howard v. People, 27 Colo. 296, 399, 61 P. 595; Kingsbury v. Peo-
ple, 44 Colo. 403, 404, 99 P. 601; Walt v. People, 46 Colo. 136, 141,
104 P. 89; Moffitt v. People, 59 Colo. 406, 412, 149 P. 104.
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TIME WHEN DUPLICITY MUST BE RAISED
A duplicitous count or information is not void but is merely
voidable; that is, it is valid unless and until the defendant, who
has that option, takes advantage of the defect by motion to quash.
Under Colorado practice, a motion to elect probably would not
be good until the defect appeared during the trial. Laycock v.
People, 66 Colo. 441, 182 P. 880. Where the fact of duplicity ap-
pears on the face of the information or count, a motion to quash,
or a demurrer, must be filed before the defendant finally pleads
to the charge. The rule against duplicity is for the defendant's
benefit, and he waives its advantage where it appears on the
face of the charge if he does not move in time. It is too late to
object after the trial has begun. Critchfield v. People, 91 Colo.
127, 131, 13 P. 2d 270.
However, duplicity may actually exist, yet that fact not be
apparent on the face of the pleading; that is, it may not appear
until the prosecution's evidence is in. The objection must be made
before the accused begins his defense, or it is waived. Sweek v.
People, 85 Colo. 479, 485, 277 P. 1.
A case where duplicity was not apparent on the face of the
information, but where it was held that a motion to quash should
have been sustained when the evidence disclosed the defect, is
Trask v. People, 35 Colo. 83, 83 P. 1010. There, the single count
charged Trask with larceny as bailee of certain household articles,
clothes, including a white dress and black hat, a diamond ring
and a named sum of money on a certain date. On its fact obvi-
ously, this charged a single conversion under a single bailment.
The evidence showed, however, that in fact there had been four
bailments, made at different times for different purposes. The
household articles and some of the clothing were entrusted to
Trask for safekeeping; the hat and dress were given to him to be
delivered to a third person; the diamond ring was turned over to
him to raise money for the use of the bailor, and the money was
given for safekeeping and to pay the expense of a trip planned
by the bailor. At the close of the prosecutions case-in-chief the
defendant moved to quash the information and for a directed
verdict of not guilty, but the trial judge refused. The supreme
court held that he should have done so and reversed the conviction.
On the other hand, in Lewis v. People, 114 Colo. 411, 415. 418,
166 P. 2d 150, the information charged that defendant became
the bailee of personal property for safekeeping and return to the
bailor. The evidence showed two distinct bailments, but also
showed they were both for safekeeping and that there was but
a single conversion. It as held that defendant's motion to quash,
made at the close of the prosecution's evidence, was properly over-
ruled because the offense lay in the criminal conversion and this
was single.
It is not the duty of the trial judge himself to protect the
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defendant against a duplicitous information; that duty is on the
defendant. Trask v. People, 35 Colo. 83, 88, 83 P. 1010, held overrul-
ing a contrary holding in White v. People, 8 Colo. App. 289, 294,
300, 45 P. 539, that it was the duty of the trial judge to correct a
misjoinder of counts. The rule is applicable alike to duplicity and
misjoinder. Trask v. People, 35 Colo. 83, 88, 83 P. 1010; Aarno
v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 520, 223 P. 41; Warren v. People, 121 Colo.
118, 121-122, 213 P. 2d 381.
This rule as to statement in a single count has no application
to situations where the sentence for a crime may be increased if
the defendant has been convicted previously of the same or other
offenses. Such former convictions must be set up in a count or
counts separate from that charging the present offense. They come
into play only if and when the accused is convicted of the sub-
stantive offense for which he is to be tried. Examples of such
situations are: (1) The habitual criminal statute, '35 C. S. A.
Supp., c. 48, §555(1) [L. '45, p. 310, §1], see People v. Wolff, 111
Colo. 46, 49-50, 137 P. 2d 693; (2) the joyriding statute, '35 C.
S. A., c. 16, §21, making a second conviction thereunder within
five years a felony, although the first offense is a misdemeanor;
and (3) section 187, chapter 16, '35 C. S. A. Supp. [L. '39, p. 229,
§4], increasing the penalty for one convicted a second time of
the offense of the driving of an automobile by an habitual user
of narcotic drugs or by one under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. See Heinze v. People, Colorado Bar Ass'n Advance Opin-
ions, February 21, 1953, page 167.
SUPREME COURT AMENDS RULE 115 (0)
(i) NUMBER OF COPIES TO BE FILED AND SERVED.
Ten copies of each motion, petition, brief, or other paper which is
typewritten, mimeographed or reproduced by some method other
other than printing, and fifteen copies of each thereof when printed
shall be filed; provided, however, that on motions for extension
of time or requesting oral argument, the original and one copy
only need be filed; and any instrument intended for the exclusive
use of the clerk, the original alone shall be deemed sufficient. Two
copies of each motion, petition, brief, or other paper shall be served
upon all parties except that in the case of typewritten motions,
briefs, or other papers one copy only need be served. Proof of
service shall be filed with the clerk. No such service shall be re-
quired upon a defendant in error who has not entered his appear-
ance in the supreme court as stated in the summons to hear errors,
but in lieu of such service one additional copy of each such paper
shall be filed. (From Supreme Court Rules 38 and 46.)




THOUGHT FOR THE MONTH
The following was expressed by Ray Murphy, General Coun-
sel for the Association of Casualty and Surety Companies in an
address delivered at the Institute on Personal Injury Litigation
presented by the Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas,
on November 14, 1952.
To summarize, I have attempted to indicate in this
discussion that there is a clearly apparent trend toward
extension of liability in tort cases. I have pointed to the
fact that the existence of actual fault on the part of the
defendant is, as a practical matter, no longer an indis-
pensable prerequisite to recovery, but rather its absence
is a mere impediment that can readily be met by flimsy
evidence of purely technical deviations from due care.
More and more, fault on the part of the plaintiff is being
disregarded. More and more, courts sanction judgments
based on doubtful and remote consequences of occur-
rences--occurrences which are not accidents in the usual
sense since there has been no contact; and more and more
courts are permitting recovery by or on behalf of infants
for injuries sustained before birth. Suits between mem-
bers of the same family are becoming more and more
common. I have noted that contemporaneously there is
a strong trend towards larger and larger jury awards,
with the rate of increase therein accelerating even more
rapidly than inflation and the cost of living.
All this may seem to paint a Utopian picture for the
plaintiff's lawyer. It may be only a mirage. One realistic
element is lacking in the phantasy-an inexhaustible and
ever present source of funds.. Since insurance companies
are not and cannot be such a source, and since no such
source exists, the trend towards higher and higher pay-
ments to more and more persons, in my opinion, can but
bring about the disintegration of our present system of
jurisprudence.
In the event of such disintegration, and if, as I be-
lieve, the then likely successor to the present system of
tort law would be a system based on compensation with-
out regard to fault-a system of purely administrative
law-we will find in such a substitute small comfort,
slight compensation and lean pickings for the negligence
lawyer. To the extent that he himself has contributed to
that result he will have contributed to his own profes-
sional demise.
"Every man owes some of his time to the upbuilding of the
profession to which he belongs."-Theodore Roosevelt.
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SENIORITY AS A PROPERTY RIGHT
KEITH H. ZOOK*
of the Den rer Bar
This article was inspired by a recent Washington case decided
October 16, 1952, in which employees of a power and light com-
pany were refused an award of money damages to vindicate their
loss of seniority rights upon the company's sale and transfer of
its business.'
(1952).
The decision of the Supreme Court of Washington on the
question is believed to be the first of its kind. "The question
presented is a new one so far as we have been informed. None of
the authorities cited in the briefs consider any claimed seniority
rights of an employee where the employer has gone out of busi-
ness . . 2 This action was instituted by Salome E. Wagner
and A. W. Wright individually and in behalf of other employees
of the power and light company to recover damages for a breach
of the collective bargaining contract between their labor union
and the company. This breach came as a result of a transfer of
the defendant company's property to the city of Seattle subse-
quent to the contract. The propriety of a suit by an individual
upon such a collective bargaining agreement as a contract made
expressly for the employee's benefit is well established by numer-
ous decisions.
The quotation following is that portion of the court's opinion
which is pertinent to the question under our consideration here.
In all of the cases where seniority as a property right
has been considered, the employer was a going concern
and able to recognize and accord to the employee his con-
tractual seniority rights. The business of defendant hav-
ing been sold and transferred, there no longer exists any
seniority in employment, and the former right thereto
is no longer such a tangible thing that the loss of it can
be measured in terms of money.
3
"Seniority" has been defined as, "The state of being older
in years, or in office; priority of age, service or rank." 4 That it
is a valuable right as bearing upon the security of an employee
and upon his opportunity to advance can scarcely be doubted. An
employee has no inherent right to seniority but obtains his right
to it through contract.5 Once such a right has been obtained by
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
9Wagner v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co ...... Wash . , 248 P. 2d 1084
'ibid., at 1085.
'Id.. at 1085.
479 C. J. S. 1041.
Wooldridge v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 118 Colo. 25, 191
P. 2d 882 (1948).
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the employee, .it is generally considered to be a property right in
the sense that an employee may sue for the loss of it when an
employer wrongfully fills a certain position which such employee
is entitled to by virtue of such right with an employee who is
junior in rank or service.
Collective bargaining agreements such as that involved in
Wagner v. Puget Sound 6 commonly contain an "assignability
clause" which provides that in the event of sale, transfer, merger
or other change in the form or management of the business, the
employee's seniority right will continue without interruption. Such
a clause is binding upon the employer's successor; but, even in
the absence of such a clause, the employees are often considered
to be similar to "fixtures" in trade and equipment, and the new
management takes over the employees with whatever their re-
spective lengths of service are at that time.7 There is no appar-
ent reason why seniority rights may not be enforced in the courts
by the application of remedies usually employed in the enforce-
ment of other legal rights.
8
Many cases recognize that there is a property right in senior-
ity in and of itself. "Although a right of seniority such as is here
asserted is undoubtedly a valuable property it arises only from
agreement." 9
The recent Colorado case of Wooldrige v. Denver and Rio
Grande Western 10 goes even farther in that it describes the senior-
ity right as a property right in which an employee has a vested
interest. in this case a majority vote of standard-gauge railroad
men in a union committee suddenly divested the narrow-gauge
men of their seniority rights. The court mentions that such action
savors of impairment of contract and the wiping out of vested
interests and goes on to say:
If the contention of the standard-gauge men is that
they have a property right or vested interest, all the
more strongly can it be urged that the narrow-gauge
men have a vested property right under the 1936 contract
whih had been in effective operation for nine years."
The court then goes on to affirm the trial court's judgment in
favor of the narrow-gauge men's seniority rights.
It would seem peculiar to say that a person has a "vested
property right" in a thing called "seniority", and in the same
breath to say that such an interest evaporates into thin air upon
the company's wrongfully disabling itself from performing the
terms of the contract in which seniority provisions are such an
6' upro.
Mitchem, Seniority Clavses iM Collective Bargaining Ag!e" ment.
RocKY MT. L. REv. 180-181 (1949).
' Fine v. Pratt, Ct. of Civ. App. of Tex., 150 S. W. 2d 308 (1941).
Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N. E. 705 (1934), p. 708.
"Supra, n. 5.




integral element. The Puget Sound Power & Light Co., to use
the language of the Washington court, "disabled itself" in this
very way by voluntarily selling its property to the city of Seattle.
12
If the employees suing in Wagner v. Puget Sound 13 had a
vested property interest which was thus destroyed, have they no
remedy for its loss? What would be the result if a corporation
decided to defeat the seniority rights of its employees by an
ostensible "reorganization" in which the employees were forced
to lose all prior seniority rights upon the formation of the "new"
corporation? The result upon the rights of the employees would
be identical in such a situation with the result in the case of a
voluntary sale of its property by a going concern, which not only
cuts short the seniority rights of employees under an existing
contract, but which abrogates them altogether.
Seniority rights are closely bound up with the right and
opportunity to earn a living, which itself has been recognized as
a property right or right of substance in the nature of a property
right, having a pecuniary value :14
This is not an action to recover damages for the
breach of an employment contract measured by loss of
wages that would have been earned had the employment
continued. The amended complaint contains some allega-
tions that would be found in one proceeding upon that
theory, but it is not so framed that, by giving it a liberal
construction to determine whether it states a cause of
action on any theory, we can say that the demurrer should
have been overruled., (Italics supplied.)
This language would seem to indicate that the court considers
the complaint as drawn up by the attorney for the plaintiffs in
this case to be inartful and ill-framed. It is possible that there
is a basic misapprehension, not only on the part of the Washing-
ton court, but in the minds of many attorneys and businessmen
as well, as to the exact nature of seniority rights. "Seniority
rights do not affect the wage but they do affect very materially
the character of the employment .... ". 16 The "choice-of-jobs"
feature of seniority rights is directly related to an employee's
opportunities for advancement and his ultimate happiness in his
work, both of which are in entirely different categories from that
of wages alone.
The material cited thus far would clearly seem to indicate
that seniority is not a mere concept or intangible interest, but
rather a valuable property right; as such it would seem to deserve
protection by the courts. If the basis for denial of recovery in
12 Wagner v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co ........ Wash ........ 248 P. 2d
1084 (1952).
" Ibid.
DE FUNIAI, HA. NrnooK OF MODER- EQUITY, 33 (1950).
.Wagner v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co ........ Wash ....... 248 P. 2d 1084
(1952), at 1085.
"Mosshamer v. Wabash Ry. Co., 221 Mich. 407, 191 N. IV. 210 (1922), 211.
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Wagner v. Puget Sound 17 be that the complaint by the plaintiffs
indicates damages whereas it should have stated another remedy,
the question would arise as to what other theory the plaintiffs'
claim for relief should be predicated upon.
An injunction would appear to be a possible approach for
these plaintiffs although success would be somewhat doubtful on
the basis of decisions dealing with the attempts to gain injunctive
relief in other cases. One court has said that since equity will
not decree the specific performance of contracts for personal
services, it will not decree specific performance of the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement relating to seniority rights. 18
On the other hand it has been said concerning a collective bar-
gaining contract involving seniority rights that the contract is
not one for personal services since it does not bind the employer
to hire any particular member because of its collective bargaining
aspect.' The conflict expressed in the two statements seems too
obvious to bear further discussion.
In Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. 20 it is stated that, ex-
cept where an employee's services are unique, no injunction to
enforce the collective bargaining contract or the seniority rights
thereunder is possible. The court continues by stating that the
only remedy in such a case is damages. The court in Harper v.
Local Union No. 520 21 mentions that some state courts hold that
the remedy at law for breach of seniority provisions by an em-
ployer is adequate and that therefore no injunction should be
permitted.
Upon examination of the adequacy of the remedy at law,
namely damages, one finds a case like Gary v. Central of Georgia
Ry. Co.2 2 wherein it was held that damages to enginemen for loss
of seniority rights were too remote and speculative to support an
action for wrongful discharge; however, the court continued by
saying that the remoteness resulted from the fact that the injury
to the plaintiffs could not be attributed solely to the railway com-
pany's breach of contract.
In the case of Capra v. Local Lodge,23 the court held that the
17 Svpra.
"Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P. 2d 404 (1935).




- Gary v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 37 Ga. App. 733, 141 S. E. 819 (1928).
Accord. Harper v. Local Union No. 520, supra.
"' Capra v. Local Lodge No. 273 of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen, 102 Colo. 63, 76 Pfl 2d 738 (1938).
The Gary case describes the amount of damages as "usually" being ineas-
ured by the employee's actual loss in wages up to the time of trial with no
recovery for loss of seniority rights even where the employee is wrongfully
discharged by the employer because of the speculative nature of such damages
and the difficulty of computing them. But cf. Wagner x. Puget Sound Power
& Light Co ........ Wash .......-, 248 P. 2d 1084 (1952), at 1085, where it is said
that: "In other cases the employee has been wrongfully discharged and has
been allowed damages based upon the compenetion paid to one of his rank."
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plaintiff employee was not entitled to a mandatory injunction en-
forcing his claimed seniority rights because the contract between
the union and the D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co. did not cover the new
Moffat Tunnel line on which the plaintiff was currently employed.
There is a strong implication in this opinion, however, that
if this branch line were covered by the contract that a mandatory
injunction would be proper remedy for the plaintiff.
This Colorado case finds a supporting precedent in Gleason
v. Thomas,2 4 in which it was held that an injunction restraining
enforcement of an order of the board of directors of the union
abolishing seniority rights was proper, for those rights, secured
through the efforts of the union, are such property rights as a
court of equity will enforce and protect. The court continues by
stating, in accord with Harper v. Local Union No. 520,25 that its
decree is proper and is not one for specific performance because
the plaintiffs may work or not as they choose.
CONCLUSION
The result reached by the court in Wagner v. Puget Sound 2t;
is probably a proper one in view of the fact that the defendant
company was no longer in a position to retain the employees;
however, since it was through no fault of the employees that
their seniority rights were lost, it would appear that the court
should hesitate in letting the defendant company breach its exist-
ing contract with impunity simply because the mere difficulty of
assessing damages is an additional escape to the admittedly ardu-
ous task of determining the exact nature of the plaintiffs' loss.
"Where there is a right there is a remedy." If the Washington-
court had clearly stated that the plaintiffs had no remedy the
decision would be clearer, but as the case stands there is a strong
indication by the court that if the complaint were drawn differ-
ently the plaintiffs might recover under some theory. Assuming
that the plaintiffs had a vested property right in this case, should
their loss of it go uncompensated for the reasons which the Wash-
ington court gives?
This article is intended to demonstrate the present confusion
and conflict which prevails with respect to the effect given to the
seniority provisions in collective bargaining contracts. It is hoped
that it will also indicate not only the need of a more uniform and
comprehensible treatment of this question in the future, but also
point out a possible approach from the property right theory. If
the interest of the practicing attorney has been in any way stimu-
lated with respect to the effect to be given these increasingly
frequent seniority clauses by the court through this article, it
has served its purpose.
2





GOODWILL AND ITS FEDERAL INCOME TAX
ASPECTS
SAM BUTLER*
Assistant Professor, University of Denver,
College of Business Administration
It is doubtful whether goodwill can be defined clearly and
accurately. First of all, it seems apparent that goodwill, unlike
other items of value, has no independent existence of its own. The
early legal opinions, which set forth definitions, are concerned
more with that to which goodwill attaches than with that of which
it consists. Among the best known of these early definitions was
that of the Lord Chancellor Eldon in a case where the sale of the
goodwill of a country waggoner was in litigation. He stated that
goodwill "is nothing more than the probability that the old cus-
tomers will return to the old place." '
A much broader and more comprehensive definition is set
forth by Judge Story in a frequently quoted statement:
The advantage or benefit which is acquired by an
establishment beyond the mere value of the capital, stock,
funds, or property employed therein in consequence of
the general public patronage and encouragement which
it receives from constant or habitual customers on account
of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation
for skill, or affluence, or punctuality, or from other acci-
dental circumstances or necessities, or even from par-
tialities or prejudices.
2
Goodwill is not a single item but consists of a number of
commercial advantages and benefits.3 Thus goodwill has been
defined as the friendliness which a consumer has toward a par-
ticular product,4 it includes an established firm 5 or trade name,
a specific or general location, 6 a reputation for service, personal
attention, or reasonable price.7 It may consist of a good name
for honesty, competence and fair dealing 8 or it may take the
*Student, College of Law, University of Denver.
'Crutwell v. Lye, 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 (1.810)
2 Story on Partnerships, Sec. 99.
'For good summaries of both the legal and accounting definitions of good-
will see: Gabriel A. D. Preinreich, The Law of Goodiwill, 9 The Accounting
Review 317-329 (1936); Preinreich, Goodwill in Accounting, 64 Journal of Ac-
countancy 28-50 (1937).
'Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 36 F. Supp. 730, 733 (D., N. J.,
1940).
Washburn v. National Wall Paper Co., 81 Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 2d 1897).
Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 36 Fed. 722.
'Burke v. Canfield, 121 F. 2d 877, 880 (app., D. C. 1941).
'A. Harris & Company v. Lucas, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 48 F.
2d 187, 189 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
DICTA
April, 1953
form of a vendor's covenant not to compete,9 a medal or certificate
of merit, or a franchise. But these various types of goodwill are
also interdependent. This relationship has been stated in the fol-
lowing manner:
The policies and condition from which goodwill
emerges are generally interrelated to a degree which
makes it impracticable to segregate the financial effects
of specific factors. . . . Good relations with employees
have a bearing on the quality and price of the product
and thus exert an indirect influence upon the attitudes
of the customers. Advantageous financial relationships
likewise are more likely to reflect the presence of intangi-
ble value resulting from the character of management
and demonstrated earning power than to constitute a
major factor in its formation. 10
Goodwill cannot exist separate and apart from a going con-
cern. It is parasitic." The study of goodwill, in a sense, is a
study of the ways and means of making it transferable. Many
forms of goodwill originally arose from personal efforts or quali-
ties and now differ only to the extent to which it is possible to
separate them from persons and attach them to a tangible object
or visible sign which may be transferred.
VALUATION OF GOODWILL
The Bureau of Internal Revenue and many courts have re-
lated the nature of goodwill to its method of valuation. The more
widely accepted approach in the accounting field is to explain
goodwill as that ability to earn "super-profits". As stated by
P. D. Leake:
Goodwill, in its commercial sense, is the present value
of the right to receive expected future super-profits, the
term "super-profits" meaning the amount by which fu-
ture revenue, increase or advantage to be received, is
expected to exceed any or all economic expenditure inci-
dental to its production.
12
The Bureau's attitude was indicated in an early ruling 11
when it stated that "goodwill" should be given "not merely the
narrow and technical meaning which has been attached to it in
numerous court decisions," but that it should "include as well the
intangible value which always attached to a more than usually
profitable enterprise by reason of its proven earning capacity."
Accountants generally will not record goodwill on the books
and records of an enterprise unless it has been purchased. In
Crutwell v. Lye, supra.
11W. A. Paton, Editor, Accountants Handbook, (3rd Ed.) 846 (1949).
Burke v. Canfield, p. 880, supra.
P. D. Leake, Goodwill: Its Nat rc and How to Value It, (1914) p. 4.
13A. R. R. 252, 3 C. B. 46.
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such circumstances goodwill would be valued by determining "the
excess of the price paid for a business as a whole . . . over the
computed or agreed value of all tangible net assets acquired." 14
This is the same approach used by the Board of Tax Appeals in
several tax cases. 15 Of course in certain instances this method
of valuing goodwill is the only satisfactory method since it uses
the monetary value of what a willing buyer and seller agree to.
From the income tax viewpoint the use of a value arrived
at by a willing buyer and seller is too limited. Although it is
possible to use such an approach in some cases, it certainly can-
not be used where no arms-length transaction has taken place.
For example, if a closely held corporation liquidates and its going
business is taken over by the stockholders who thereafter operate
as a partnership no arms-length transaction has taken place and
it becomes necessary to calculate the value of the goodwill.
Quite early in the development of the income tax law, the
Bureau issued a ruling 1 setting forth a method of determining
the value of goodwill. If a business is such that when properly
managed it will not yield a profit, it is not a desirable business
and its goodwill cannot be considered of any value to a prospec-
tive purchaser. Goodwill is the chance of expectancy of securing
a future profit. Therefore in valuing goodwill it must be remem-
bered it is a problem concerned with the future and not with
the past. But past events must be considered because they are
essential guides as to expected future earnings.
The income tax method of determining the value of goodwill
as explained in A.R.M. 34 17 is calculated in the following manner.
(1) Determine the average tangible assets for a period of five
or more years. (2) Take a definite percentage (e.g., 10 percent)
of the average tangible assets as representing an average or normal
return on the investment in tangible assets. (3) Determine the
average actual earnings for a period of five or more years. (4)
Determine the excess of the actual earnings (as determined in
the preceding step) over the normal return (as determined in
step 2). This represents the super-profits. (5) Capitalize these
super-profits at some definite rate (e.g., 20 percent). This amount
represents the value of goodwill.
The normal rate of return on the investment in tangible assets
and the capitalization rate will vary in each case. For example,
a less hazardous business would probably use 8 percent and 15
percent respectively instead of 10 percent and 20 percent.
The above method clearly relates the value of goodwill to
14 Eric L. Kohler, A Dictionary for Accoittonts, (1952) p. 205.
l' M. Werk & Co., 15 B. T. A. 954 (1929) ; American Seating Co., 4 B. T. A.
649 (1926) ; Market Supply Co., 3 B. T. A. 841 (1926) ; Rockford Brick & Tile
Co., 4 B. T. A. 313 (1926).
1A. R. M. 34, 2 C. B. 31. Other rulings pertaining to the computation of
goodwill are A. R. R. 2954, HI-2 C. B. 202; S. M. 1609, 111-I C. B. 48; S. M. 2435,




the theory of super-profits and bases its value on past experience.
In other types of court cases other methods have been used to
value goodwill. One arbitrary method quite commonly accepted
in the state courts is is the three or five year purchase method.
A return of a certain percentage (e.g., 6 percent) is allowed on
the net investment. This return is deducted from the average
actual profits and the difference multiplied by three or five years.
Even more arbitrary is that method where the goodwill is
determined by multiplying the actual average profits by 3, 5, 10,
or more years. 19
The Bureau's method in the valuation of goodwill generally
has been followed by the courts in those cases involving income
tax. This approach involves a better grasp of the fundamental
principles of valuation of goodwill since super-profits are used
in its calculation.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOODWILL AND OTHER ASSETS
It should be fairly obvious that the mere existence of super-
profits does not always assure the existence of goodwill. It is cer-
tainly possible that an enterprise may show above normal profits
and have it attributed to some intangible 20 asset other than good-
will. Perhaps the greatest deficiency in the opinions of the courts
dealing with intangibles generally has been a failure to distinguish
between goodwill and other intangible assets also possessing value,
a failure which has possibly been due to the manner in which the
cases have been presented to the courts. Most of the decisions
involving federal taxes have dealt with March 1, 1913 value of
a business or the value. of an interest in a closed corporation or
partnership. Since in these cases both the court and counsel have
had their attention directed primarily to the question of whether
any intangible value exists, the term goodwill was often used
loosely. The designation of all and sundry intangible values as
goodwill didn't make any great difference in the resulting tax
consequences. However the distinction between goodwill and
other intangibles is present in many tax questions today and is
quite important. But the picture is still not very clear and per-
haps the Supreme Court's comment in 1893 is still true when it
said, "Undoubtedly goodwill is in many cases a valuable thing,
although there is difficulty in deciding accurately what is included
under the term"..
2'
The goodwill of many enterprises has been built through the
efforts and ability of a single individual. That such personal good-
will was thought not to be transferable was recognized early.
2 2
" For example see: In r' Demarest, 157 N. Y. S. 653, 655.
. For annotations see: 24 A. L. R. 1046; 57 A. I R. 1163.
' As used in this paper intangibles have reference to those assets having
no physical existence, its value being dependent on the rights that possession
confers upon the owner.
-1 Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U. S. 446.
"Mandeville v. Harman, 42 N. J. Eq. 185.
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But it doesn't necessarily follow that goodwill built up by the
efforts of an individual cannot be transferable. In partial recog-
nition of the personal goodwill and to assure the purchaser of a
going business protection from loss of this goodwill, a covenant
not to compete is entered into by the seller. This keeps the seller
out of certain specified trade area for a limited period of time.
From the viewpoint of the income tax aspects of the problem, it
is important to segregate the value assigned to an agreement not
to compete from goodwill.2 3 The value assigned to the agreement
not to compete can be amortized by the purchaser so as to reduce
taxable income 24 but goodwill cannot be amortized or depreci-
ated.
25
The taxability of personal goodwill has been at issue in sev-
eral tax cases.2 6 The knowledge, experience, ability, skill, acquaint-
anceship and other personal characteristics of individual em-
ployees do not constitute goodwill regardless of the fact that they
may be of substantial commercial benefit to the business enterprise.
Other intangibles that have been confused with goodwill are
franchises, patents, and copyrights. Each of these items can have
a definite legal life and as a result can be amortized or depreci-
ated for income tax purposes. In a 1946 case 27 involving an auto-
mobile dealer's franchise the court held that no goodwill value
could be assigned to a business where whatever goodwill was
possessed was connected with the franchise and such franchise
could be terminated without notice or cause.
If any of the super-profits of the business are due to the
patents, licenses, franchises, or copyright, deduction for deprecia-
tion will be permitted over the useful life of such assets.s
INCOME TAX SITUATIONS INVOLVING GOODWILL
There are several possible cases where goodwill enters into
the tax considerations. Care must be exercised to recognize that
the problem is present-otherwise serious tax consequences will
result. Most of these cases involve problems of valuation and can
be summarized in the following manner:
(1) March 1, 1913 values. Prevalent in the earlier tax cases
have been those situations where the March 1, 1913 value has
been at issue. In determining the proper basis of an asset acquired
prior to March 1, 1913, it is necessary to know its fair value as
of March 1, 1913. Therefore it is essential to establish the value
of goodwill of a going business in order to establish its proper
tax basis.
"' For a case that discusses this distinction see Aaron Michaels 12 T. C. 17.
B. T. Babbitt, Inc., 32 B. T. A. 693 (1935).
Sec. 29.23 (1)-3 of Regulations 111.
21 Providence Mill Supply Co., 2 B. T. A. 791 (1925); Northwestern Steel &
Corp., 6 B. T. A. 119 (1927); D. K. MacDonald, 3 T. C. 720 (1940) acq., 1944
C. B. 18; Howard Lawton, 6 T. C. 1093 (1946) acq., 1946-2 C. B. 3, revd. on other
grounds, 164 F. 2d 880 (C. C. A. 6th, 1947).
SFloyd D. Akers, 6 T. C. 695 (1946).
"' Sec. 29.23 (1)-3 of Regulations 111.
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(2) Change in the organizational form of a continuing busi-
ness. If a closely held corporation liquidates and the stockholders
continue to operate the business as a partnership, the transaction,
being a taxable exchange, calls for the calculation of a taxable
gain or loss. Essential to this calculation is the determination of
goodwill presently existing in the business. This sometimes can
be true in the case of changing a partnership to corporate form
of business organization.
2 9
(3) Depreciation or obsolescence. If goodwill has a tax
basis 30 generally no depreciation or obsolescence will be allowed.
The regulations are quite specific on the point.31 Furthermore the
Supreme Court has ruled that no deduction is permitted.
3 2
(4) Sale of goodwill. If goodwill has a tax basis a gain or
loss can result upon a subsequent sale or exchange.3 3 If goodwill
has no tax basis a gain can result upon its sale in conjunction
with the sale of a going business. Since goodwill does not fall
within any exceptions to the Internal Revenue Code definition 4
of the term, it would appear to be a capital asset. In most court
cases it has been assumed to be a capital asset.
35
MEDICAL ASPECTS OF TRIALS EXPLAINED
A new monograph on "The Medical Aspects of Negligence
Cases" has been published by the Practising Law Institute. Writ-
ten by Charles Kramer, an active trial lawyer of the New York
firm of Kramer & Dillof, it explains the tactics and techniques
of expert trial lawyers.
The new publication is one of a series of 29 monographs on
Trial Practice, which also includes two companion monographs
on "Preparation of Negligence Cases" by A. Harold Frost and
"The Trial of a Negligence Action" by Harry A. Gair. Copies
of these monographs may be purchased for $2 each from the
Practising Law Institute, a non-profit educational institution with
offices at 57 William Street, New York 5, N. Y. A catalog of all
Institute publications is available on request.
'Most such exchanges can generally qualify as non-taxable under Sec. 112
(b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code.
NUsually goodwill can only acquire a tax basis if purchased or if in ex-
istence as of March 1, 1913.
Sec. 29.23 (1)-3 of Regulations 111.
'Clarke, Collector v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Company, 280 U. S.
384 (1930).
"' Sec. 29.22 (a)-10 of Regulations 111.
4Sec. 117 (a) (1).
'Ensley Bank & Trust Co. v. U. S. 154 F. 2d 968, 969 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946)
cert. den. 329 U. S. 732 (1946).
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TAX-FAVORED PENSIONS IN SIGHT FOR
THE SELF-EMPLOYED
EARL S. MacNEILL* and GORDON T. WALLIS*"
There are 11,000,000 people in the United States who are self-
employed: farmers, doctors, dentists, osteopaths, chiropractors,
optometrists, veterinarians, lawyers, accountants, architects, engi-
neers, industrial designers, chemists, ministers, social workers,
writers, artists, actors, musicians, dancers, real estate and insur-
ance brokers and agents, actuaries, investment counsel, professional
athletes, funeral directors, and a host of others.
To these 11,000,000 are denied certain tax privileges enjoyed
by some 8,000,000 employees of others who are participants in
pension plans established by their employers and "qualified" un-
der Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code. Payments made
by the employer into the fund from which the pensions will be
paid under a plan so qualified are deductible by the employer.
Income which may be earned by this fund is tax-free--as are
capital gains also. Most important to the individual: the pay-
ments made by the employer into the fund for the employee's
ultimate benefit are not currently taxable as income to the em-
ployee. He will be taxed only on the pension when he receives it,
and normally he will be in lower brackets then because the pen-
sion will be lower than his wage or salary while employed.
Now consider the plight of the 11,000,000 self-employed.
Whatever they may be able to put aside to provide for their old
age they will have paid a tax on first. If they invest their old-age
reserve, the income and gains of the reserve will be taxable. It
would seem only fair to give them the same tax treatment as the
8,000,000. A measure is pending in Congress which would do
this. Curiously it has met with objections that it is discrimina-
tory, favoring the rich. We'll come back to the objections later:
first, the bill.
Actually there are two identical bills in the House of Repre-
sentatives, one introduced by Representative Eugene J. Keogh
and the other by Representative Daniel A. Reed, both of New
York; one a Democrat and the other a Republican-thus a bi-
partisan aspect is given.
There's a little history to these bills. They were introduced
early in 1951; and a companion proposal was offered by Senator
Irving M. Ives as an amendment to the then-pending Revenue Act
of 1951. The amendment "died in committee," as the quaint phrase
is, because there was inadequate time to study it. The Keogh-
Reed bills survived in their original form (H.R. 4371 and H.R.
*Vice President, Irving Trust Co., New York.
**Assistant Secretary, Irving Trust Co., New York.
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4373) to be the subject of a one-day hearing before the House
Ways and Means Committee on May 13, 1952. Many constructive
suggestions came out of the hearing, as a consequence of which
the bills were redrafted and presented anew as H.R. 8390 and
H.R. 8391. Hereafter, for simple syntax' sake we'll refer to the
bills in the singular; and the modified version will be described,
with but occasional passing reference to the original.
COVERAGE OF PROPOSED LAW
It is called, "A Bill to encourage the establishment of volun-
tary pension plans by individuals."
What individuals? They are not necessarily self-employed.
A "qualified individual" is defined as any individual except one
who is employed and who is a member of a pension or profit-shar-
ing plan established by his employer and qualified under Section
165 (a) ; or is eligible to become a member of such a plan upon
meeting certain requirements; or is already a pensioner under
such a plan. Excluded also are employees and pensioners of na-
tional, state and local governments and agencies having retirement
plans.
So now we have qualified individuals, who generally will be
self-employed but may be the employees of employers having-
as to them, at least-no qualified tax-privileged retirement plan.
Any such person may exclude from his gross income, in any tax-
able year, subject to certain limitations, that portion of his earned
income that he has paid within 60 days after the close of such
year to a "restricted retirement fund" or to a life insurance com-
pany as premiums under a "restricted retirement annuity con-
tract."
What are the limitations? Basically, the annual exclusion
cannot exceed 10% of the taxpayer's earned net income, or $7,500,
whichever is the lesser; and the aggregate excludable during the
taxpayer's lifetime is fixed at $150,000. But there are variations.
To make it possible for older persons to build up worth-while
retirement funds during the relatively few years remaining to
them before they must cease to work, there is this special provi-
sion: that anyone over 55 years of age on January 1, 1952, may
increase his excludable amount each year by 1% of earned net
income, or $750, whichever is the lesser, multiplied by the num-
ber of full years of his age over 55-but not over 20 years or
beyond age 75. In the interest of flexibility there are provisions
for the carry-over of "unused exclusions" which are rather too
technical for our purposes here.
Payments must be made in a certain way, as we have noted:
either into a restricted retirement fund or as premiums on a
restricted retirement annuity contract.
A restricted retirement fund is defined as a trust fund form-
ing part of a bona fide retirement plan for the exclusive benefit
of its participating members. Who may--or should-sponsor such
a plan is not specified. The trustee must be a bank. Investments
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are not necessarily limited to the "legals" of any state; the trust
instrument may set the investment rules-to the extent permitted
by local law. Income from investments will be added to the prin-
cipal and re-invested; the income of the trust will be tax-free.
A separate account will be kept of each member's contributions
and the earnings derived from their investment. The share of
the contributing taxpayer in the trust fund cannot be withdrawn
until he is age 65, unless he sooner dies or suffers total and perma-
nent disability.
On retirement, payment of the participant's accumulation
of contributions, gains, interest and dividends, and the re-invest-
ments thereof, may be made under one or more of the following
options:
(1) In a lump sum;
(2) In annual, quarterly or monthly installments of a desig-
nated amount over a period of years;
(3) By purchase by the trustee, in the name of the member,
of one or more single premium life annuity contracts
with or without a guaranteed minimum return and with
or without a survivorship option.
If payment is made in a lump sum it will be treated as a
long term capital gain (which is the same treatment as under
Section 165(a) plans) provided it represents the accumulations
of at least 5 years. Any other payments will be taxable as ordi-
nary income when received.
In the original version of the bill, payment through a trust
was mandatory. That is, there was no provision for direct deal-
ing between taxpayer and insurance company in the purchase of
annuity contracts. This was not a capricious omission: deferred
annuity contracts presently available have such features as cash
surrender value and assignability which would defeat the pur-
poses of the statute. Upon representations by the insurance com-
panies that suitable contracts could be devised, an alternative
method of "funding" was provided: the purchase of "restricted
retirement annuity contracts" which would be issued in conform-
ity with Treasury regulations so that the contracts could not be
surrendered or assigned and generally would conform-as to time
and manner of payment-with the requirements laid down for
restricted retirement funds.
One matter of definition remains: what is "earned income?"
It includes wages, salaries and professional fees, of course. It
includes, also, income received from literary, musical or artistic
compositions or from the copyright thereof. It excludes com-
pensation which represents a distribution of corporate profits
rather than a reasonable allowance as compensation for personal
services actually rendered. Troublesome problems relating to part-
nerships and proprietorships where both personal services and
capital are income-producing factors are relegated to regulations
to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
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Such is the general outline of the proposed law and one well
may wonder what the shooting was all about that sought to kill
the bill as "class legislation."
It may have been a fault that committees of the American
Bar Association, the New York State Bar Association and the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York joined in formu-
lating the original bill. Indeed, the impression somehow got about
that this was primarily a "lawyers' retirement project." But the
roster of organizations whose representatives appeared or filed
statements in support of the measure (in principle, if not in
every detail) was impressive testimony to the universality of its
application-and its appeal:
American Bar Association, American Dental Association,
American Farm Bureau Association, American Federation of Ra-
dio Artists, American Guild of Musical Artists, American Guild
of Variety Artists, American Institute of Accountants, American
Institute of Chemists, *American Life Convention, American Medi-
cal Association, American Osteopathic Association, Actors' Equity
Association, Artists' Managers Guild, Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, Association of Stock Exchange Firms, Au-
thors League of America, Inc., Chicago Bar Association, Chorus
Equity Association, Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice,
District of Columbia Bar Committee on Legislation, Engineers
Joint Council, Illinois Bar Association, Investment Counsel Asso-
ciation of America, *Life Insurance Association of America, Na-
tional Society of Professional Engineers, New York State Bar
Association, Pennsylvania Bar Association, Society of Industrial
Designers, Television Authority (AFL).
True, there are a few bar groups scattered throughout the
list, but it must be admitted that they are in varied company-
doctors, brokers and writers on one side; chorus girls, actuaries
and engineers on the other. And it is hardly on the whole, a Who's-
Who of the ultra-rich.
Particularly convincing on this point was Dr. Frank G. Dick-
inson, speaking for the American Medical Association. Basing his
computations on recent surveys of professional incomes by the
United States Department of Commerce, he stated that the monthly
cash refund annuity under the plan, starting at age 70, would
average: for physician, $208; for lawyers, $146; for dentists,
$140. The average amount excludable annually would be $1,290
per physician; $860 per lawyer and $756 per dentist, "
if every physician, lawyer and dentist (and their wives) were
actually willing to set aside 10% of their earned incomes. "
Among performers in the television radio and concert fields, it
was stated by their representatives more than 50% earn less
than $2,000 a year in a single entertainment medium-although
total income might be somewhat higher.




Verily, few are the nabobs among the self-employed as com-
pared to the richly rewarded executives of large corporations who
are permitted to participate in their corporations' tax-favored
plans-and frequently without any ceiling on the benefits pay-
able to them! But the ceiling of $150,000 in tax-favored contribu-
tions permitted by the Keogh-Reed bill (assuming uniform pay-
ments of $7,500 annually into the fund during the years between
age 45 and 65, and an investment income rate of 31,4%) would
permit purchase, at age 65, of a cash refund annuity, at prevail-
ing rates, of no more than about $950 monthly. This would repre-
sent at most only about 15% of the average earnings during those
years. Compare that with the approximately 50% of average
earnings which the retirement benefit of many up-to-date cor-
porate plans represents. And how many self-employed people,
struggling to educate children and pay off mortgages, would be
able to save the $150,000 maximum out of earned income, even
with the privilege of tax exclusion? Not many.
In various ways, it was pointed out by speakers at the hear-
ing, if any discrimination is involved it presently exists in favor
of employees and officers of corporations-and in favor of corpo-
rations themselves. For example, said Mr. George Roberts, Chair-
man of the Special Committee of the American Bar Association
on Retirement Benefits:
.. It is now practically universal in corporations
of any size to have a pension plan which, in most cases,
is a non-contributory plan and which gives a substantial
amount of security against old age and disability. Scarcely
a month goes by but some young lawyer talks to me about
the advisability of his abandoning the independent prac-
tice of law and joining a corporation, sometimes as a
lawyer and sometimes as one of the corporation's execu-
tives. The persuasive argument is always the security
afforded by the corporation's pension plan. I have no
doubt that the same tendency exists in the other pro-
fessions. ...
I ask you, gentlemen, to consider this problem, not
only from the standpoint of fairness and equity to the
individuals involved, but also from a standpoint of public
policy. Is it for the best interests of this country that
legislation should be so framed that the professions and
self-employment are not encouraged, but are discriminated
against in favor of employment with corporations-the
bigger, the better?
Another kind of discrimination was described by Mr. Leslie
M. Rapp, representing the New York State Bar Association and
other professional groups, and principal draftsman of the Keogh-
Reed bill:
A doctor may have to spend $40,000 to become a
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doctor, but he cannot even write off the cost of becoming
a doctor..
If I go out and buy a peanut-vending machine, and
vend peanuts, I can write off the cost of the machine
against profits pro rata over the life of the machine, and
ultimately get my money back tax-free. But I cannot re-
cover the cost of my education, and I get no deduction on
account of the depreciation of my earning power or the
depletion of the human body.
Any profession one can think of costs some money for train-
ing-if not $40,000; and dancers and professional athletes come
quickly to mind as examples of activities wherein physical deple-
tion is not merely important-it is a frightening prospect.
During the hearing on May 13th quite a little was made of
the fact that lawyers and some other professional groups had
excluded themselves from the benefits of Social Security. As an
argument against the Keogh-Reed bill it failed of aim, we feel,
as if a man should be condemned for saying, "I don't like persim-
mons but I like apples." Certainly, no one would deny him his
apples.
Representatives of the bar who spoke at the hearing con-
ceded that personally they would like to have the benefits of Social
Security but patiently explained that they were not endorsing
the Keogh-Reed bill as a substitute for Social Security-indeed
it would be a supplement to Social Security for millions of self-
employeds, not now excluded from Social Security, who would
be entitled as "qualified individuals" to accumulate their own
supplementary pension reserves. Proponents of the bill strove to
make this fact understood: that the essential purpose of the bill
is to bring to the self-employed no greater benefit-if as much-
than is available to wage and salary earners under the Revenue
Act of 1942 upon which the present structure of corporate pen-
sion and profit-sharing plans is founded. Dr. Dickinson put it
in the plainest possible words:
Now the Social Security Act is the first part of the
triad in developing the new social theory about pensions;
namely, that the government ought to do something to help
people provide for their old age.
The second part of that triad is the Revenue Act of
1942, Section 165, that has been referred to so often.
The third part of it is the Keogh-Reed bill. Without
the Keogh-Reed bill your triad of new social attitude
toward pensions and retirement allowances is just like a
tripod supporting a camera with one leg broken.
"The self-employed grow old and suffer the vicissi-
tudes of old age just as much as the people who have
been employed [by others] during their working lives.
Nature does not permit them to escape just because they
are self-employed and excluded under the Act of 1942.
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Mr. Rapp prefaced his statement by obeserving that, "Some
17 years ago in this room we saw the birth of the Federal Social
Security Act. I would venture the hope that today we might wit-
ness at least the labor pains of another act of equal social signi-
ficance."
The words were well chosen. There is much labor still to
be done and great pains laboriously to be taken, if not suffered.
First, a truly vast amount of education must be done on the
subject. Consider that but a day was given to the hearing, which
involved some other simialr bills; and many of the speakers were
hurried along. The public study given was scarcely commensurate
with the importance of the subject. Much study in private has
been made, notably by the American Medical Association. There
should be wide dissemination of the arguments for the measure
through newspapers, magazines and other vehicles of informa-
tion and discussion-as well as of any arguments against the
measure or directed toward its improvement.
Second, there is a great deal to be done along legislative
lines. Some further refining of the provisions of the Keogh-Reed
bill is inevitable and changes in state laws will also be necessary.
For example, the provision in the bill limiting a contributor s
ability to withdraw his interest in the fund poses problems relat-
ing to the rights of creditors. Again, present state laws which
grant immunity from statutes against perpetuities and accumula-
tions to pension and profit-sharing trusts apply only to trust,
established by employers, not by employees. Committees of the
American Bar Association and State Bar Associations are ready
with the texts of simple revisions which will extend the necessary
immunities to plans established under the Keogh-Reed or similar
acts.
Third, there is much planning of a practical nature to be
done. The Keogh-Reed measure is but the framework of a plan.
Trust companies and life insurance companies must formulate
plans and policies. In its earlier version, the Keogh-Reed bill
required that plans be sponsored by professional or trade asso-
ciations, farmers' guilds and similar groups, with participation
limited in each case to their own membership. While this require-
ment has been dropped-at the instance of some of the associa-
tions themselves, who did not want their disciplinary processes
complicated by consideration of loss of pension rights-it is prob-
able that the principal associations will formulate plans tailored
to the needs of their members; and, as a matter of organizational
pride, membership in the association, guild, council, society or
league plan will be sought and encouraged.
It is not too soon for organizations such as these to set up
committees, if they have not already done so, for the study and
perfection of plans and to make tentative arrangements for their
funding, be it with insurance companies or bank trustes. Much
valuable time thereby will be gained should action on the bills be




The Keogh-Reed bills were reintroduced on January 3,
1953 under the title of Jenkins-Keogh bills, H.R. 10 and H.R.
11. As a consequence of the election the House of Representa-
tives came under Republican control and Representative
Daniel A. Reed, co-sponsor of the bills, became Chairman of
the Ways and Means Committee in which tax legislation in
the House of Representatives originates. For Procedural rea-
sons Congressman Reed's name is no longer connected with
the proposed legislation.
The new members of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee are as follows:
REPUBLICANS
Daniel A. Reed, of New York,
Chairman
Thomas A. Jenkins, of Ohio
Richard M. Simpson, of Penn-
sylvania
Robert W. Kean, of New
Jersey
Carl T. Curtis, of Nebraska
Noah M. Mason, of Illinois
Thomas E. Martin, of Iowa
Hal Holmes, of Washington
John W. Byrnes, of Wisconsin
Angier L. Goodwin, of Massa-
chusetts
Antoni N. Sadlak, of Connect-
icut
Howard H. Baker, of Tennes-
see
Thomas B. Curtis, of Missouri
Victor A. Knox, of Michigan
James B. Utt, of California
DEMOCRATS
Jere Cooper, of Tennessee
John D. Dingell, of Michigan
Wilbur D. Mills, of Arkansas
Noble J. Gregory, of, Ken-
tucky
A. Sidney Camp, of Georgia
Aime J. Forand, of Rhode Is-
land
Herman P. Eberharter, of
Pennslvania
Cecil R. King, of California
Thomas J. O'Brien, of Illinois
Hale Boggs, of Louisiana
The Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association
unanimously resolved to support this legislation at a meet-
ing held February 9, 1952, and the members of the Denver
Bar Association adopted similar resolutions on April 7, 1952.
These bills should have the full and active support of
the members of every profession. Each member of the legal
profession is urged to write his Congressman and members
of the Ways and Means Committee to support this worth-
while legislation.
KENNETH L. SMITH,




FROM THE LOS ANGELES BAR BULLETIN
The following notice appeared in Dicta, publication of the
Colorado Bar Association:
COUNTRY LAWYER NEEDED
Paonia and the entire north portion of Delta County is in need
of a lawyer to take over an established law office. Anyone inter-
ested may contact Clair H. Hadley, Town Clerk of Paonia, Colo-
rado, or phone FRemont 0113 or AComa 3771 in Denver.
B. Nonymous, little known brother of the prolific A. Nony-
mous, was so touched on reading of Paonia's plight that he dashed
off the following touching lines:
Oh there's panic in Paonia,
Not a lawyer can be found
Within the village limits
Or the county half around.
Decedents die intestate
Who'd prefer the testate route
And claims are lapsing all about
That should be brought to suit.




No smog corrupts Paonia's sky,
But o'er her like a pall
There broods this melancholy thought:
No lawyer-none at all.
What that the woods abound with game,
The mountain streams with trout-
When lawyers scattered on the map
They left Paonia out.
Attend again Paonia's plea:
"Oh Lawyer, Come, We'll love you.
Why tarry in the city then
Which holds so many of you?"
NOTE TO MR. B. NONYMOUS: The editor of Dicta is happy
to report that the crisis in Paonia is passed and that one full time
and one part time lawyer are now serving her needs. Your deep
concern for Paonia's plight is appreciated by the Bar of Colorado
and the people of Delta County.
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DENVER INSTITUTE IS SCHEDULED
The Junior Bar Sections of the Colorado and Denver Bar As-
sociations and the University of Denver School of Law are the co-
sponsors of an institute on "Practical Ethics and Practice" to be
held on Tuesday and Thursday afternoons from 4:30 to 6:00 with
an optional additional half hour for questions, beginning April 14,
1953, and concluding May 5, 1953.
The sessions will be held in the auditorium of the School of
Business Administration located in the Civic Center campus of
the University of Denver.
The topics to be covered in the institute include: (1) Profes-
sional Conduct and Ethics, (2) Relations with Courts and Other
Lawyers, (3) Standardized Pleadings in Colorado Courts, (4)
Public Legal Services of the Organized Bar, (5) Relations with
Clients, the Public and the Community, (6) Law Office Records,
Practices and Determination of Fees, (7) Unauthorized Practice,
(8) State Appellate Practice, and (9) Federal Court Practice. It
will be noted that these nine topics will be combined into seven
sessions.
A fine array of speakers has been obtained, and it is the in-
tention of the committee in charge of the institute to mail a com-
plete program to each member of the Denver Bar Association.
LAW DAY SET FOR MAY 2ND
The Boulder County Bar Association and the University of
Colorado School of Law announce that Saturday, May 2nd, has
been selected for their annual Law Day. The subject chosen for
this year's program is "Pitfalls in Probate and Trust Practice".
The morning conference, starting at 9:30 a.m. in the Geology
auditorium, will consist of three speeches on the following sub-
divisions of the topic:
1. "Estate Administration," Judge Howard 0. Ashton,
County Judge, Boulder County.
2. "Liabilities of Personal Representatives," Edward C.
King, Vice Chairman and Director of the Trust Divi-
sion, American Bar Association.
3. "Fiduciary Investment and Taxation Problems," Rich-
ard P. Brown, Vice President, International Trust
Company, Denver.
Following the conference there will be a luncheon at Wayne's
Cafe for all guests and their wives. Tickets are $2.00 a plate.
Harold Reeve, retiring Chairman of the Probate Section, American
Bar Association and Vice President of the Chicago Trust Com-
pany, will speak. The winners of the Rothgerber Appellate Brief-
ing and Argument Competition will also be presented and the




TORTS-TORT FEASOR IS NOT ABSOLVED BECAUSE
THE ONE INJURED WAS VIOLATING A PENAL LAW-
Every now and then the members of as reputedly "dry" a pro-
fession as the legal fraternity have something to smile about. Such
a momentary lapse from the air of stiff austerity (assumed or
otherwise) that the law throws about itself is offered by a cursory
glance at the opinion of our High Court in Harris v. Iacovetto
(----Colo .-...... 1952-53 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4, p. 53).
Rex Harris was an employee of Sam Iacovetto, who was an
ardent pursuer of the fruits of his fellow men's weakness for
the unpredictable awards of the age old sporting devices, cards
and dice. In short, Sam ran a gambling table, and Rex was one
of his operators. The tactical headquarters for the enterprise was
Artesia, Colorado. The scene of operations was a bar in Vernal,
Utah.
The suit arose out of an automobile accident occurring be-
tween Artesia and Vernal as the two parties were returning home
after an evening's work at the mutually satisfying venture. The
employer was driving when the car suddenly went out of control
and eventually lodged on its side against a fence next to the high-
way after turning over.
Harris brought suit in the district court of Moffat County,
basing his claim to damages on lacovetto's simple negligence. The
plaintiff attempted to avoid the burden of proving intent to harm
or wilful and wanton misconduct on" the part of the defendant
as our guest statute requires 1 by alleging that he was a passenger
for hire.
Defendant moved for a dismissal at the conclusion of plain-
tiff's case on the theory that plaintiff was a guest, or, if not a
guest, then a passenger for hire who was barred from recovering
because the employment was pursuant to an illegal contract for
gambling. The trial court thereupon granted the motion and dis-
missed the case, the reason seeming to be that if plaintiff was in
fact a passenger for hire, then the relationship was based on an
illegal enterprise and plaintiff would consequently be precluded
from recovering.
The trial court was reversed upon appeal, something which
should have come as no great shock to most.
The defense interposed by the defendant, and the trial court's
ruling thereon illustrate the facility with which tort law can be
confused with contract law by some. The law of negligence is
predicated upon the theory that some act, or the failure to act
when such action is the duty imposed by law, must contribute
''95 C. S. A., c. 16, see. 371.
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proximately to the invasion of an interest of another before the
actor will be answerable. Inherent in this is the fundamental
principle that the injured person's claim for damages will not
survive if his own actions (or inactions) are the proximate cause
of his injuries. Hence the doctrines of contributory negligence
and last clear chance arise. To prevent a party from recovering
for injuries based upon the negligence of another solely because
he was indulging in an illegal act at the time without regard as
to whether such illegal undertaking contributed proximately to
his injuries is to disregard completely numerous authorities.
2
189, 258 P. 1094; City of Pueblo v. Smith, 3 Colo. App. 386, 33 P. 685; Arnold
v. Owens, 78 F. 2d 495; 38 Am. Jur., sec. 213, p. 899.
It would be inconceivable that our Supreme Court could have
held otherwise than it did when it stated (p. 54) :
Plaintiff should not be denied relief if the illegal
factor contended for by the defendant, and sustained by
the court, had no causal connection with the injury of
which complaint is made.
The sometimes arbitrary maxims of "public policy" can be-
come a dangerous impediment to the cause of justice in the hands
of well-meaning but unforseeing courts. Let's keep such maxims
out of the law of proximate cause unless better reasons than the
ones entertained in this case are found.
KENNETH R. WHITING.
2 Martin v. Carruthers, 69 Colo. 464, 195 P. 105; Arps v. Denver, 82 Colo.
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Eighty Years Of Service
Four score years ago, in 1873, Shepard's hung up its
shingle and began furnishing the legal profession
with a case citation service limited in scope and
cumbersome in form.
Today, eighty years later, Shepard's publishes a com-
prehensive citation service in compact form covering
every state and federal jurisdiction from coast to
coast and embracing all types of citations-to cases,
to constitutions, to statutes, and to other reposi-
tories of law. The little 1873 group of initial pur-
chasers has grown to thousands upon thousands of
members of the Bench and Bar to whom SHEPARD'S
CITATIONS has by their. own acknowledgment be-
come an "indispensable service."
On this occasion of the eightieth anniversary of its
founding, Shepard's looks with confidence and faith
to the future and continues firm and resolute in its
determination ever to be of the greatest possible
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